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ABSTRACT- In this article, we examine how European authorities have responded to 
reported threats to aviation resulting from individual terrorist tactics. We do so by applying 
the notion of political resilience and drawing on Palonen’s ”policy, polity, politicking and 
politicization” model as well as on Malcolm Anderson’s concept of ”politics of the latest 
outrage”. We argue that the EU response to aviation terrorism has created polity 
transformation and generated a long list of new policies but has also in the process become 
politicised and subject of politicking, with some high-profile measures being criticised for 
having a deleterious impact on passengers’ rights.      
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Introduction  
 
The aim of this paper is to apply some of the ideas developed in the conceptual model presented in 
the introductory section of this volume to explore how the European Union has responded to a 
series of specific terrorist threats. More particularly, the main concern in our analysis is to examine 
the reaction of European authorities to reported threats to aviation resulting from individual terrorist 
tactics. We will analyse in the process how the European aviation security policy dossier has 
evolved in reaction to the loopholes revealed by the incidents that supposedly required an additional 
layer of protection. Finally, we will draw on Palonen’s ”Four Times of Politics: policy, polity, 
politicking and politicization”1 as well as on Malcolm Anderson’s concept of ”politics of the latest 
outrage”2 in order to better understand how notions of resilience can be understood in practice in the 
context of European aviation security policies.              
 
It is important to note that it is not our goal to provide a comprehensive listing of all the initiatives 
that the EU has produced in this field, nor to discuss aviation security initiatives prior to 9/11 (for a 
short list, see table 1). Rather, we shall focus on those initiatives that have a clear association with 
the particular incidents, i.e. initiatives where it can be demonstrated that they emerged as a direct 
reaction to the events and that they originated from European actors either at the domestic or EU 
levels. In principle, this means that some important – and controversial – mechanisms such as the 
EU-US Passenger Name Records (PNR) agreement would fall outside the scope of the paper.3 
 
Table 1: Major Pre-9/11 International Initiatives to Secure Civil Aviation4 ABOUT HERE 
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In addressing these objectives, we will apply the definition suggested by Malkki and Sinkkonen in 
this special issue. We therefore understand political resilience in the context of European civil 
aviation security policies as “the way that continuity and transformation take place in the face of 
specific endogenous or exogenous shocks in all aspects of political life”.5In other words, the 
capacity of the political system [in this case, European aviation security regulations] to proactively 
face the threat and recover through ”robustness” and continuity or changes in polity, policy, 
politicization or politicking. 
 
The above definition explicitly incorporates the two key dimensions of the traditional understanding 
of resilience: reducing vulnerability (resilience as part of critical infrastructure protection) and 
facilitating recovery (resilience as part of response management). Our analysis will mainly focus on 
the former. This is due to the fact that the measures introduced in the period under study have 
tended to prioritise target hardening. In other words, they have aimed to deter terrorist attacks by 
raising the security standards to the extent that such attacks would be – in theory – prohibitively 
difficult and/or costly. Clearly, due to the potentially huge loss of life in the case of a successful 
terrorist attack on an airliner, both international and domestic aviation security systems mainly 
focus on preventing incidents in the air. Measures whose goal it is to return the system back to 
normality can of course be imperative when dealing with terrorist strikes in airports on the ground.6  
In sum, when considering the four phases of resilience described by Boin, Comfort and Demchack 
(mitigation/prevention, preparation, response/consequence management and recovery/aftermath 
politics) we would like to clarify that our analysis will focus squarely on the first stage.7 
 
We also acknowledge the fact that when it comes to normative changes and adaptation there are 
different views on whether they are good or bad.8 Hence we will not attempt to offer an assessment 
of the value of specific European responses (i.e. describe them as ”positive”or ”negative”) but we 
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will instead reinforce the idea that there has been a lively debate at the European level regarding the 
efficiency and proportionality of some of these measures, and that due to conflicting interests, there 
is no consensus amongst European institutions themselves about whether some of the initiatives – 
as originally proposed – have been a “good” or a ”bad” thing. As we will see, the EU has been far 
from being a unitary actor in this matter.      
 
For this reason, it is important to precisely determine not only the position of the key EU 
institutional actors (the Commission, Council and the European Parliament (EP)) but also the nature 
of the “resilience response”: is this to ensure the robustness of the system (resilience as resistance 
and maintenance), to make superficial amendments that do not affect the fundamental character of 
the regulatory structure in place (change at the margins) or to completely overhaul the system 
(openness and renewal)?9 As we will argue later on, all these facets have been present to varying 
degrees in the European response.    
 
In addition, and as suggested in the introduction of this special issue by Malkki and Sinkkonen, we 
will draw heavily on Palonen’s ”Four Times of Politics” typology (policy, polity, politicking and 
politicization) when discussing the political context that led to the emergence of the EU regulatory 
framework. Palonen understands policy as the redirection of resources and efforts towards certain 
goals, polity as the space where political activity occurs, politicking captures the performative 
nature of politics and politicization the act of naming something as an object for political debate. 
We will engage more comprehensively with these terms when it comes to the application of the 
model in the discussion section. 
 
With these conceptualisations in mind, the argument that we are making is that the field of aviation 
security has evolved in a partially uncoordinated manner following external shocks to the system 
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represented by high-profile terrorist attacks and plots. Or in the words of Sweet, attacks on 
commercial aviation have “received sporadic intensive attention, usually after some weighty 
tragedy.”10 Of course, this case has been already made by one of the authors in relation to EU 
counter-terror policies more generally11 but what this contribution does is to complement and enrich 
this insight with a set of constructive notions associated with the idea of political resilience. The 
paper is structured as follows: we will start by presenting an overview of incidents that have most 
significantly contributed to shape European regulation in this field (see table 2 for a timeline). We 
will then proceed to describe the specific policy responses adopted by European institutions in 
response to these terrorist acts. We will apply the model next, clarifying how the concepts of policy, 
polity, politicking and politicization can help us to understand the evolution of the European 
regulatory framework and the associated political debates. Finally, we will conclude with a few 
words on the explanatory value of the political resilience model.         
Table 2: Timeline of Incidents – ABOUT HERE 
 
Case Studies  
 
September 11 2001 
On September 11 2001, Al Qaeda carried out the most lethal terrorist attack in human history so far 
by turning four hijacked planes into flying suicide bombs – two of which (American Airlines Flight 
11 and United Airlines Flight 175) brought down the Twin Towers, while one (American Airlines 
Flight 77) badly damaged the Pentagon.12 The fourth hijacked plane (United Airlines Flight 93) 
crashed near Shanksville, Pennsylvania, when hijackers and passengers fought over control of the 
cockpit. This series of attacks cost nearly 3,000 people their lives, and inflicted economic damages 
and disruptions amounting to several billion of US dollars13 – or even several trillion US dollars if 
one takes the costs of the ensuing Global War on Terrorism into consideration.14 However, this 
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attack did not only establish suicide hijacking as the latest phenomenon of aviation terrorism but 
also led to a profound overhaul of aviation security.  
 
Prior to 9/11, aviation security measures were based on the assumption that terrorists would not be 
willing to sacrifice their own lives, which is why, apart from screening procedures with variable 
degree of alertness and training of security personnel involved, passenger-baggage reconciliation 
was one of the keystones of security measures.15 The other one was the computer-assisted passenger 
pre-screening (CAPPS). Developed in 1996, CAPPS was meant to flag up suspicious passengers for 
special security screening measures.16 Interestingly, in the case of 9/11, CAPPS worked quite well: 
eight of the 19 hijackers were flagged up by the system. However, the only special measure taken 
was monitoring them until they boarded only to then load their baggage as usual. Not even their 
hand baggage was more closely inspected. Had the hijackers had a Lockerbie-style attack in mind, 
this would very probably have been prevented. Against suicide bombers however, this post-
Lockerbie security regime proved to be ineffective.  
 
Following the attacks, the US created the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) to 
strengthen the security of its transportation systems.17 The federal agency was established through 
the Aviation and Transportation Security Act, which transferred airport screening duties from 
private airlines to this new body.18 Among the first measures adopted by the US authorities was 
restricting the type of items that could be taken on board, now excluding all kinds of scissors, knifes 
or any other potentially dangerous objects that could serve as a weapon. A second measure was the 
introduction of intrusion-proof cockpit doors in order to prevent hijackers from entering, followed 
by a routine deployment of so-called sky marshals on a number of flights that were deemed high 
risk. Both measures however proved to be controversial: some pilots associations (for example the 
British Airline Pilots Association, BALPA) argued that intrusion-proof doors would undermine 
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their control over the aircraft and could potentially be dangerous19, while airlines themselves were 
reluctant to reserve income-generating first or business class seats for a sky marshal – these usually 
being the seats nearest to the cockpits.20 Thirdly, and following the 9/11 Commission’s 
recommendation, the USA also introduced an additional security measure with regard to the pre-
screening of passengers: the Electronic System for Travel Authorization (ESTA) as a requirement 
for passengers travelling from visa-waiver countries.21 
 
The security response soon spilled over onto the international level. Before the 9/11 attacks, 
intergovernmental arrangements on aviation security were generally agreed at the International 
Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO), an UN agency,22 whereas the European Union (EU) lacked 
formal competencies in this field. Since ICAO produces mostly non-binding recommendations, the 
level of harmonisation regarding air safety in Europe was rather limited: each member state had its 
own regulatory framework.   
 
Under the impression of 9/11 however, aviation security rapidly became an urgent priority on the 
political agenda of EU member states. European governments soon realised that in order to ensure a 
swift response that would be widely and efficiently carried out across Europe, they needed to 
”Europeanize” them. Thus the safety of civil aviation was placed under the aegis of the European 
Union Transport Policy dossier. This decision had significant practical implications. It meant that 
rather than being part of the former Third Pillar23 that dealt with Internal Security matters and was 
mostly intergovernmental in their decision rules, aviation security was regarded instead as a First 
Pillar matter. By placing these types of policies under the supranational EU Common Market 
framework, Member States were ensuring that EU institutions could use the First Pillar strong 
enforcement mechanisms24 and binding legislation (EU Regulations and Directives) to guarantee 
the consistent implementation of security measures in European airports. Making aviation security a 
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Community policy also allows the European Commission to take a visible role: the supranational 
decision-making process means that it has the exclusive right of initiative, that is to say, it is the 
only European institution that can formally introduce policy proposals in this area. Nonetheless, 
Commission proposals must be first approved through qualified majority voting by an Aviation 
Security Regulatory Committee (AVSEC) where national representatives meet. The Community 
pillar decision-making also involves the Council of Ministers and European Parliament (EP) as co-
legislators, which, as we will show later, has had important implications for the EU response.    
 
The policy debates in Brussels were further accelerated by the shoe bombing plot of 22 December 
2001, just three months after the events of 9/11. In that incident, ”shoe bomber” Richard Reid 
attempted to detonate an explosive charge hidden in his trainers – an attempt that failed because the 
explosives had got humid through sweat. Passengers also travelling on this American Airlines 
Flight 63 from Paris to Miami could overwhelm Reid before he could do any harm.25 Although 
improved passenger scanning by way of full body scanners was discussed after this event, the only 
additional measure introduced to the already vastly improved security measures in the wake of the 
9/11 attacks was the requirement that passengers had to put their shoes on the belt for scanning if 
asked to do so.26 However, this failed plot further demonstrated to what great length Al Qaeda 
would go to attack airliners as arguably one of the most iconic and symbolic targets for terrorists.  
 
Hence, the combined effects of the 9/11 shock and the ”shoe bomber” plot of December 2001 
encouraged the Commission to prepare a policy proposal leading to the adoption in 2002 of the first 
set of European common rules in aviation security.27 The document ”followed almost to the letter” 
the international standards set by the ICAO.28 In order to achieve the objective of increasing the 
resilience of the aviation sector, this EU Regulation called for Member States in 2002 to adopt 
programmes on national civil security, quality control and training and to create a national authority 
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responsible for the coordination and monitoring of such programmes. It also listed a set of 
provisions that had to be met by airport authorities, operators and airlines. The detailed security 
requirements referred to an extensive list of separate but interrelated elements: the design or layout 
of airport buildings; control of access to sensitive areas of airports and aircrafts; passenger and 
baggage screening; searching and checking of aircrafts; controls for cargo and air carrier suppliers 
and the training and recruitment of relevant staff. In addition, it outlined a set of guidelines for 
security equipment (metal detection, X-ray) and a classification of prohibited articles.29 All these 
provisions had the overarching goal to raise minimum common standards of security in European 
airports. Member states’ governments also retained the right to implement more stringent measures 
if they deemed them necessary.  Most consequentially, this European law provided the Commission 
with significant executive powers, which is rare in EU security policies: it allowed them to carry out 
joint inspections on the ground with national representatives to ensure that these Community rules 
were properly applied by individual airports.30 
 
As shown above, the 2002 regulations undoubtedly represented a comprehensive package of 
measures. Yet, given the existing political context, the 2002 regulation was approved with little 
political debate.  Furthermore, when these rules were amended in 2005, it was against a backdrop of 
a hectic period of European counter-terror decision-making brought about by the terrorist attacks in 
Madrid and London. Effectively, the inspections carried out by the European Commission had 
revealed a series of shortcomings: there was a need to make easier to modify the more technical 
aspects of the legislation, some common requirements required clarification and rules needed to be 
extended to freight and in-flight security.31 As a result, changes were proposed in the screening of 
passengers, training of staff and security checks on aircraft. The amendment of the security rules 
was also used to expand the Commission competencies to cover in-flight security measures and air 
traffic from third countries. When an overhaul of the legislative framework was finally adopted in 
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200832, the regulation included new provisions in areas such as access to cockpits or the presence 
on board of ”sky marshals”.33 Therefore, gradual reforms to the rules have been continuously 
carried out during this period and the last significant amendment of the rules was conducted in 
2010.34 
 
2006 liquid explosives plot  
In parallel to the discussions on the amendment on EU common rules, the discovery of the 
transatlantic airliner plot revolving around liquid bombs in August 2006 led to further amendments 
in the form of ad hoc, community-wide measures: on 9 August 2006, British police arrested 24 
persons suspected to plot an attack on ten transatlantic airliners by way of smuggling ”liquid 
bombs” on board.35 The plan revolved around peroxide-based liquid explosives (mixed with orange 
drink powder) filled into 500-millilitre soft drink bottles via syringes in order not to damage the 
original seals of the bottles, thus pretending they were not used. Due to timely intelligence, this plot 
could be nipped in the bud before the terrorists were prepared to strike. 
 
The transatlantic airliner bombing plot was actually already the second time that liquid bombs were 
meant to be used to bring down passenger airliners: in 1995, a similar Al Qaeda-related plan to 
destroy up to twelve transpacific airliners was discovered in the Philippines.36 At that time, the 
discovery of this rather sophisticated plot had no impact on aviation security. The renewed attempt 
to use liquid bombs however resulted in immediate and very severe security measures. In the UK 
for example all hand baggage except for wallets, passports or IDs and travel documents were 
initially banned. Action however did not stop there: the UK then rushed to take this matter to 
Brussels and, in September 2006, the EU member states agreed to request the Commission to adopt 
an EU level ban on most liquids in hand luggage. Discussions at the Council of Ministers revolved 
around whether the liquid bomb that the cell was attempting to smuggle on board would have been 
11 
 
powerful enough to cause catastrophic damage and to destroy the targeted airliners. Reports from 
British intelligence services helped to convince other government representatives and the internal 
debate mostly concentrated on the extent of the ban and the quantities of liquids to be restricted.37  
The decision was approved within less than a month, which equals to lightning speed for Brussels 
standards. An apparent cost that came with this swiftness was that no process of consultation with 
private actors, including commercial airlines or airport associations, was undertaken. The 
Commission quickly approved the ban and on 4 October an EU regulation controlling the 
movement of liquids through the screening checkpoints was adopted for that purpose.38 It entered 
into force on 6 November 2006.        
 
As in the case of the UK, the EU decision allowed individuals to bring on board a maximum of 10 
containers of less than 100 millilitres each. These containers had to be held in a 20cm square 
transparent, re-sealable plastic bag and put in a tray for inspection – both visual and per scanner. A 
few exceptions applied: liquid medicines or baby milk for example, were exempted under certain 
conditions.39 Originally, those measures were restricted to planes departing from EU territories but 
it eventually led to a rapid worldwide spread of the norm. The adoption of the rules in Europe 
motivated other countries to imitate this response and American and British lobbying efforts 
resulted in a non-binding recommendation by the ICAO for all members to also apply the ban.40 
 
This legislation was later renegotiated and the EP has used its prerogative to request an evaluation. 
As a MEP from the centre-right EPP-ED group pointed out: ”Nobody seems to know – or care –
whether these rules are efficient, as no evaluation has taken place and no results of such evaluations 
have been published.”41 On 5 September 2007, MEPs adopted a Resolution calling on the 
Commission to review and, if necessary, repeal the rules. Finally the EP in 2010 reached a 
compromise with the Commission and the Council to lift the ban in April 2013, with the 
12 
 
understanding that scanner technology would soon be capable to distinguish liquid explosives from 
innocuous liquids. However, due to concerns from EU governments and the airline industry 
regarding the effectiveness of the new liquid-screening technology – and following lobbying efforts 
from the French and British governments (both of which had forces engaged in the Libya)42 – only 
a small and partial lifting of the ban was implemented. The complete phase-out was postponed to 
January 2016.43 In a meantime a process of assessment that included the discussion of a further 
gradual lifting of the rules would be carried out.44 As part of the process, a new rule was enacted in 
January 2014 for European airports to introduce special liquid explosive detection equipment for 
the screening of liquids, aerosols and gels.  
 
Crucially, the EP has always been critical of the ban for a number of reasons: popular concerns due 
to the inconvenience it caused passengers and the doubts regarding the proportionality and 
effectiveness of the measure. Furthermore, the restrictions have been strongly criticised for resulting 
in confusion and delays at European airports, where thousands of litres of alcohol and perfume were 
reportedly confiscated from passengers every week.45 Of course, European airlines and airport 
companies who were unhappy about the costs associated with the measure have also lobbied 
European MPs hard.46 
 
2009 underwear bombing plot 
The controversial debate on the pros and cons of introducing full body scanners (backscatter 
scanners or millimetre-wave scanners) that started in the aftermath of the failed December 2001 
shoe bombing attempt gathered pace again after the underwear-bombing plot of Umar Farouk 
Abdulmutallab. On Christmas Day 2009, the Nigerian national attempted to detonate an explosive 
charge47 hidden in his underwear on board of Northwest Airlines Flight 253 from Amsterdam to 
Detroit on the final stage of this flight.48 Fortunately, like Reid before, Abdulmutallab failed to 
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ignite the plastic explosives due to their exposure to humidity, and could hence be subdued by other 
passengers. Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) claimed responsibility. Again, 
Abdulmutallab had been flagged up by computerized pre-screening, but nothing untoward was 
found at that time. 
 
The event did certainly focus minds on the limits that airport metal detectors with regard to finding 
non-metallic threat items on persons.49 As an immediate reaction, additional screening measures 
were introduced in a number of airports (notably Schiphol and Heathrow) for transatlantic flights. 
In a demonstration of political solidarity, in January 2010, the US and the EU signed a joint 
declaration in which they pledged to help enhancing global aviation security measures.50 
 
Meanwhile, EU member states started to reconsider the inclusion of the body scanners on the EU 
list of scanning techniques since previous efforts to achieve so had failed. The EP had long opposed 
the measure mainly on these grounds: firstly, they thought they could pose health risks to 
passengers since X-ray backscatter systems, a type of scanners used in the US and UK, exposed 
passengers to ionising X-ray radiation. Secondly, the more revealing body scanner images violated 
privacy rights and could open the door to abuses. The European Data Protection Supervisor 
(EDPS), the Article 29 Data Protection Working Party and the Fundamental Rights Agency were 
also concerned that the introduction of security scanners could have a great impact on data 
protection of passengers.51 The Commission itself acknowledged that a number of fundamental 
rights could be violated in the context of body scanners.52 
 
To prepare a European response, and following a request from the European Parliament, the 
Commission issued a fact-finding report on this technology.53 The document was not a product of 
independent research but it rather provided a collection of national assessments. The Commission 
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then adopted a communication on 15 June 2010 on the use of security scanners at EU airports. The 
document offered as a rationale for the proposal the fact that the ”different standards of scanners 
currently deployed in Europe bring a serious risk of fragmenting fundamental rights of EU citizens, 
impeding their rights of free movement and escalating their health concerns related to new security 
technologies”.54 The communication therefore attempted to address the national divergences that 
the uncoordinated increased use of this technology across national borders was generating by 
adopting in response a harmonised approach.    
 
Following from this communication and negotiations with the European Parliament that led to a 
number of modifications, in November 2011 the Commission adopted a legislation including 
security scanners as a further eligible method in the common list of screening and controlling 
technologies, allowing airports the voluntary deployment of scanners in security checkpoints.55 
 
2010 toner cartridge bombing plot 
In October 2010, Saudi Arabian intelligence sources informed Western services that packages 
containing 300 to 400 grams of plastic explosives were on board of various cargo planes leaving 
from Yemen. Transferring to US-bound flights at airports in Germany and the UK, the bombs were 
hidden in the toner cartridges of Hewlett-Packard laser printers. It remains unclear whether cargo 
planes or passenger planes were targeted since much airfreight is actually transported by the latter. 
An alternative possibility is that the bombs were meant for synagogues in various US cities. Again, 
AQAP claimed responsibility. In their view, the operation still was a success, as they pointed out in 
a communiqué: even though it failed, it forced Western countries to spend ”billions of dollars in 
new security measures. That is what we call leverage.”56 
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Indeed, many aviation security specialists had already warned that airfreight in general and cargo 
planes in particular were still highly vulnerable to bombing attacks even in a post-9/11 
environment: compared with passenger planes, security measures taken here are rather lax. In fact, 
although the European common rules introduced in 2002 formally addressed the security control on 
cargo, the strengthening of this aspect of aviation security only became a political priority after the 
discovery of the toner cartridge bombing plot.  
 
The first consequence of the 30 October plot was an important institutional change: the creation of a 
High-Level Working Group.57 This high-level group on air cargo security set a number of 
recommendations in a report that were quickly endorsed by the Commission and the Council.58 
Firstly, they suggested new harmonised EU cargo and mail security controls. This would involve 
new rules to facilitate more stringent screening of cargo originating from outside the EU. In 
response, the Commission produced legislation requiring air carriers to ensure that cargo from third 
countries would either come from a trusted source or be screened for explosives or flammables 
before it was allowed to fly into the EU. Moreover, in ”high risk” locations enhanced screening for 
cargo now was required by way of a combination of two or more screening measures.59 
Interestingly, three months after the foiling of the plot, the Commission undertook an assessment 
mission to Yemen and found that ”several additional security measures had been put in place at the 
Sana’a airport at the time”.60 
 
In parallel, Member States were encouraged to accelerate the implementation of the EU's system of 
supply chain security. This was designed as a regime to approve trusted operators (”consignors”) 
who would work as regulated agents in this sector. The Commission and relevant national 
authorities would also have to strengthen the compliance monitoring of the cargo and mail rules,61 a 
recommendation that resulted in an increase on the number of cargo security inspections. They 
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would also need to improve staff training, which was addressed with more training courses for 
national aviation security inspectors. Furthermore, they were requested to invest more in detection 
technologies and screening research so the Commission did eventually include cargo screening in 
its calls for proposals within the Framework Programme for EU Research and Development.   
 
Secondly, better intelligence and threat information sharing was also seen as a priority. A common 
EU threat assessment capability would have to be developed. The result was a risk assessment 
system based on information about threats that national governments provided to the European 
Intelligence Analysis centre (INTCEN) at the European External Action Service (EEAS) and 
informed by vulnerabilities identified by the industry.62  Interior ministers from MS were meant to 
sit together to discuss and define the threats, assess vulnerabilities and categorise the level of risk 
(low, medium, high).63 
 
Finally, the Working Group also called for a global approach involving as a first step the swift 
implementation of ICAO's latest revision to Annex 17 enhancing cargo security rules.  In line with 
this suggestion, the EU did also collaborate with the US in committing the ICAO to produce a 
declaration encouraging states to invest more efforts and resources on enhancing air cargo and 
supply chain security. Following from this, mutual recognition between the EU and US air cargo 
was also agreed. With the objective of establishing one-step controls on US-bound flights, the 
relevant US authorities were also willing to collaborate with the Commission and the European 
Civil Aviation Conference.64 
 
It is interesting to note the impact of the reforms brought about by the toner cartridge plot on 
cooperation and collaboration. According to the EU Counter-terrorism Coordinator, the report by 
the high-level group ”brought the transport and the security community close together and the 
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cooperation had reached a new level” even though currently there still is a need ”to do more for the 
information exchange with the industry” and ”increase cooperation with third countries”.65 In the 
long term, the most important result from this process may well be a shift towards a risk-based 
approach, where data from different sources (both public and private) are closely integrated into a 
threat assessment used to inform policy. This brings greater transparency into the process and helps 
to address the criticism by member states regarding past decision-making, with individual MS (i.e. 
UK) presenting their own intelligence (i.e. on liquids explosives) in Council meetings and 
demanding regulatory changes (i.e. liquids ban).66 
 
 
Discussion  
 
The European common policy of aviation security owes its existence and evolution to a series of 
high-profile jihadist terrorist attacks and plots that have targeted Western aviation since 11 
September 2001. The sense of urgency generated in the aftermath of the incidents discussed has 
resulted in renewed political pressure for European actors to close potential security loopholes 
through Community legislation. This general attempt to strengthen resilience within the sector has 
brought about a piecemeal development of this policy dossier: on the one hand we have witnessed 
the rapid introduction of ad hoc measures, on occasion without a thorough consultation with 
relevant actors or, according to critics, serious consideration for the proportionality and 
effectiveness of the particular initiative.  On the other hand, these urgent, reactive responses have 
generally been refined with time and the involvement of more institutional actors. It must also be 
noted that ad-hoc measures have been accompanied by a more measured parallel process of gradual 
amendment of the European common security rules introduced in 2002. Here, changes to the rules 
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have tended to be informed by the evidence gathered from regular inspections by the Commission 
and national authorities.     
 
Before embarking on a more elaborate analysis conducted within the context of political resilience, 
it is important to note that a situation where the EU has become a relevant actor in setting aviation 
security policies in Europe is already remarkable, given the fact that internal security is a sensitive 
aspect of European governments’ sovereignty. It is debatable whether this particular sphere of 
political activity would have become institutionalised so rapidly at the European level without the 
political pressure engendered by the external shocks that punctuated the existing policy equilibrium, 
triggering a wave of post-hoc reactions to major terrorist events – a kneejerk-like course of action 
that Anderson has called ”the politics of the latest outrage.”67 By forcing national governments to 
communitarise this sphere of action, 9/11 led to a profound change in the polity of aviation security: 
the ”complex in which the power shares are divided into legitimate and illegitimate ones”.68 Thus, 
through institutionalisation at the European level, the demarcations of the safety of aviation polity 
opened up to include new actors and decision-making processes.  
 
We argue that this development can be seen as an example of the third type of resilience described 
by Bourbeau: an exercise of openness and renewal. It demonstrates how a new regulatory 
framework can be created to preserve the core purpose of the system: the protection of European 
passengers. The rationale behind the institutional overhaul that the communitarisation of aviation 
security represents is the concern for ”weakest links”: to guarantee the safety of passengers in 
inbound flights departing from other European member states requires all EU countries applying 
similar practices. In short, national aviation security requires neighbours sharing common security 
standards.  
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We would like to emphasise that this should not be read as member states completely relinquishing 
control of these policies: they not only had the capacity to introduce more stringent versions of the 
initiatives agreed in Brussels but they could also oversee the work of the Commission through the 
comitology procedure.69 In reality, even if the Commission directorates70 had the power to develop 
proposals, these have been fundamentally shaped by the work of national experts present in 
Aviation Security Regulatory Committee (AVSEC) with whom they work closely together.  
 
Therefore national governments until recently had a very tight control of decision-making in this 
area. As Barros describes71, although the Commission had the right of initiative it also generally 
allowed member states to set the agenda for two main reasons: firstly, political pressure in the 
aftermath of terrorist incidents pressed member states into demonstrating a consensus for the 
necessity of enhanced security levels. This position was generally reinforced by pressure from the 
United States, who encouraged European governments to introduce body scanners in their airports 
and supported the creation of institutional structures that would facilitate the exchange of 
information and the sharing of good practices.  As illustrated by the liquids ban case, it was also 
willing to work with specific member states (i.e. the UK) to facilitate the globalisation of these 
norms.        
 
Secondly, the Commissions’ influence was limited due to the absence of a clear agenda on the 
contents of the legislation, apart from usual remarks on the necessity of having a European rather 
than national regulatory framework. Due to the fact that the Commission and member states 
seemingly shared similar policy interests, the former primarily acted as coordinator and facilitator 
of resilience-building policies.   
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It was only with the growing stature and interest in these matters shown by the European Parliament 
that the aviation security polity experienced explicit political struggles over policy. This should not 
come as a surprise given that the EP often demonstrated its opposition to the most controversial 
elements of EU counter-terror policies. As in other instances, the EP, more specifically its Civil 
Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (LIBE) Committee72, was critical of the proportionality and the 
potential negative impact on citizen’s civil liberties of some of these initiatives, especially the body 
scanners. Thus, MEPs actively used tools such as expert hearings, resolutions and plenary votes to 
bring public attention to matters of effectiveness and passengers rights. The statement by the MEP 
from the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe (ALDE) parliament group Jeanine Hennis-
Plasschaert on a September 2007 debate on the liquid ban encapsulated this position nicely:   
 
”We have been calling upon the European Commission to ensure that the security measures 
in place are efficient, well balanced and implemented in a reasonable manner for passengers, 
airlines and airports. The measures restricting liquids aboard aircrafts do not seem to 
correspond to any of these criteria. The Commission has to come up with a better regulation. 
Exaggerations should not rule daily life of European citizens!”73 
 
In other words, the EP engaged in acts of politicization. In Palonen’s words, they marked aviation 
security ”as political, as a spielzeitraum for contingent action”.74 Instead of accepting the general 
attitude by Member States and the US of treating threats to aviation as a security matter, that is to 
say, outside the boundaries of standard political discussion, MEPs incorporated these measures back 
into the political realm.   
 
The MEPs’ exercise of opposition politics (what we can consider a particular form of performatives 
or politicking) was prevalent following the 2006 introduction of the liquids ban. Thus, a more 
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confrontational stance was facilitated by a changing political climate where concerns over the costs 
of the increased layers of security could be more freely expressed, a period where the pendulum 
started to swing back from ”security” to ”liberty” in European public discussion. As an illustration, 
by 2007 a large majority of MEPs were supporting a resolution to review the liquids ban even in the 
wake of media reports of separate terrorist plots being uncovered in Germany and Denmark. 
Moreover, whereas the 2002 common rules were passed without much debate with ”everyone still 
under the shock”, when the time came to update the framework there were lengthy debates leading 
to the 2008 reforms amongst MS, the Commission and the EP ”about who has the power to do 
what”.75 
 
In the context of performatives and politicking, it should be noted that Anderson’s notion of 
”politics of the latest outrage” is based on examples of urban terrorist attacks76 but it can also be 
applied to the aviation sector. In both cases, attacks result in a call for tougher action against the 
perpetrators from a variety of non-government sources (especially from the public at large and the 
mainstream media), indeed ”creating an overwhelming pressure”.77 Hence, in these cases the 
politics of the latest outrage is clearly linked to the demand of both public and mainstream media 
for immediate action, possibly based on a shared concern about the random character of the attacks. 
 
In addition, as officials from two British airports independently from each other argued78, the 
importance of commercial aviation, both passenger and freight, for national economies further 
encourages a rapid government response. As one of them highlighted, stricter and even potentially 
intrusive measures are implemented –if need be– even against the resistance of airport operators and 
airlines, who find themselves in a difficult position: on the one hand, they also have an interest to be 
seen to ”do something”, otherwise they might lose the confidence of their customers, at least until 
the most recent incident slips from public memory and the ”outrage” settles down.  
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On the other hand, they are well aware that additional layers of security can be costly. For example, 
in the wake of the events discussed above, airport operators had to allocate ever more money and 
space originally earmarked for shops and restaurants for screening zones and technologies, thus 
losing revenue, while airlines had to increase the price of tickets on top of allocating business or 
first class seats to air marshals, thus missing on potential customers.79 The additional costs enforced 
on them are especially galling if they are perceived to be based on unsubstantiated threat alerts 
issued by various intelligence agencies – the February 2014 threat warnings issued by DHS on 
explosives hidden in toothpaste tubes or new ”shoe bombs” as discussed above are telling examples 
of how little proof is required nowadays for creating yet another terrorist threat scare.80 
 
Even so, it goes without saying that not every measure has been subject of conflicting interests and 
politicisation. European initiatives following the foiling of the printer cartridge bomb attack were 
approved without much criticism, for instance. We would contend that this was due to the fact that 
they only affected industry players in the cargo sector and thus appeared to have no visible, direct 
impact on European citizens’ privacy rights. Hence, the ”human-interest” factor was notably absent 
– which probably explains the complete absence of any media and MEPs interest.   
 
In the light of the above, it is worth questioning the actual impact on the final policy content of the 
EP attempts at politicization. The comitology reforms in 2006 and the entry into force of the Lisbon 
Treaty gave the Parliament veto rights, which MEPs used to a certain extent to shape policy. We 
argue that EP action has led to change at the margins in case of the scanners. They were finally 
accepted in the list of scanning methods but the EP obtained some amendments to the legislation in 
the process: it gave passengers the right to opt instead for a manual search and a ban on x-ray scans 
was introduced due to concerns regarding their effects on passengers’ health (they had to be 
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replaced by millimetre wave scans).81 With regards the liquids ban example, this can be better 
described by the last type of resilience, openness and renewal, since in practice it would represent 
the replacement of sub-standard measures for, in paper, more effective tools (the substitution of X-
ray transmission detectors for more advanced liquid-screening technology like X-ray diffraction) in 
order to preserve the resilience of the system.         
 
 
Conclusion  
 
The EU response to aviation terrorism has created polity transformation and generated a long list of 
new policies but has also in the process become politicised and subject of politicking. Active efforts 
by institutional actors at the European level have successfully resulted in substantial – albeit 
reactive and often haphazard – policy development. Yet the existing inter-institutional tensions and 
charged political debates have also reflected the controversial character of aspects of this response, 
with some high-profile measures being criticised for having a deleterious impact on passengers’ 
rights.      
 
On balance however, to argue that the EU is an important actor should not be understood as 
implying that national governments are passive actors in this area. On the contrary, they often 
engage in ”venue-shopping”82:they decide on which international arenas for cooperation to 
approach based on their own particularsecurity priorities. For example, EU regulations are legally 
binding for member states, but ICAO recommendations are not. This would then explain for 
instance why the British government decided to approach the EU first: there was a need to quickly 
achieve similar levels of security in airports across Europe and this had to be enforceable.      
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The irony of course is that, in this post-Lisbon Treaty era, by escalating the response to the EU 
level, national governments lose their full control of the policy. Once European legislation on 
airport security required the approval of the European Parliament, it meant that the decision-making 
process became open to politicisation moves and the policies subject to conflictual relations 
between actors in the polity.     
 
In sum, all this highlights the relevance of non-state counter terror actors in responding to terrorists’ 
change of methods and operations. Decisions taken in Brussels can have serious repercussions for 
European counter-terrorism. In some cases, they are not only necessary for a successful reaction to 
terrorist innovation but they also shape the resilience of the system. In doing so, they force terrorist 
groups to engage in further learning and adaptation processes in what it can be defined as a 
continuous action-reaction cycle.    
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